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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the proceeds deposited pursuant to eminent domain statutes requiring 
interest at the rate of 8% per annum as part of just compensation, where the proceeds are 
deposited in court to be paid forthwith but cannot be forthwith withdrawn, are deemed 
"trust funds" subject to provisions of a separate statute relating to persons depositing 
money in court, to be held in trust for other purposes. The trial court's interpretation is 
reviewed for correctness without deference to the trial court's conclusions. See 
Butterfield Lumber. Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp.. 815 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Utah App. 
1991); Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
2. Whether the Administration of the Judiciary Rule 3-407(3) excludes money 
deposited pursuant to eminent domain statutes by defining trust accounts as those 
established for the benefit of third parties and stating as examples those funds held for 
restitution, child support and bail amounts. The court's interpretation is provided no 
deference and is reviewed for correctness. Id 
3. Whether the appropriation of interest on money deposited in eminent domain 
proceedings is in effect the imposition of a tax which the courts are without constitutional 
power and authority to assess to be reviewed for correctness. RL Utah Constitution Art. 
XIII Section 5, vests power to tax in political subdivisions. Smith v. Carbon County. 90 
Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259, 108 ALR 513 (1936). 
4. Whether the appropriation of interest on money deposited in eminent domain 
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proceedings is a civil fee, which must be set by statute, not judicial rule. Section 21-1-5 
Utah Code Annotated. Article XXII Section 2, Constitution of Utah provides for the 
legislature to establish fees collected by all offices. The trial court's decision is reviewed 
for correctness. See Butterfield. 815 P.2d at 1332; Berube, 771 P.2d at 1038. 
5. Whether it is inherent in the definition of "trust" that the Trustee appropriate the 
funds for use of the beneficiary and not to itself. 
6. Whether it is necessary to perfect a property right by procedural rules where a 
constitutionally perfected and protected right gives rise to the property right. 
7. Whether the state of Utah can appropriate and retain interest earned on the 
principal amount belonging to the Appellants in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
8. Whether governmental immunity statutes are applicable to cases where another 
statute or the Constitutions allow suit notwithstanding governmental immunity in other 
cases. 
Paragraphs 5-8 are all questions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. See 
14 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY AND RULES PROVISIONS 
SET FORTH IN THE ADDENDUM. 
Section 78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated. 
Article I Section 7, Utah Constitution. 
3 
Article I Section 22, Utah Constitution. 
Article XIII Section 5, Utah Constitution. 
Section 21-l-5(bb) Utah Code Annotated, "There is no fee for service or filing of 
documents not listed in this section or otherwise provided by law." 
Article XXII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. 
Article V, Section 1, Utah Constitution. 
Section 78-27-4 Utah Code Annotated. 
Administration of the Judiciary Rule 3(407)(3)(f). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case. 
This is an appeal from the Findings and Judgment of the trial court granting the 
Appellees' motion to dismiss the Complaint before answer or other proceedings, denying 
the Appellants' demand for payment of interest deposited by the Utah Department of 
Transportation in an eminent domain proceeding. 
B. Course of proceedings. 
Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"), filed a Complaint under its eminent 
domain rights to acquire part of the land of Security Investments Ltd. ("Security") and 
William K. Olson ("Olson") located in Woods Cross, Utah, for highway purposes. 
UDOT joined several other entities as defendants who are either financial institutions or 
tenants who were shown of record to have an interest in the entire parcel, of which only a 
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small part was taken. The action was filed against Security on March 7, 1997, and against 
Olson on March 14, 1997. The defendants, other than Security, did not disclaim until 
April 1999 and as to Olson until some time in February and March 1999. UDOT had 
previously deposited $292,350.00 for Security and $139,300.00 for Olson with the Clerk 
of the Court pursuant to Section 78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated, on August 18, 1997 for 
Security and on May 20, 1997 for Olson pursuant to Orders Of Immediate Occupancy. 
Security and Olson claimed an entitlement to interest on the deposited funds. The 
Clerk and Administrative Office of the Court refused to pay interest earned on money 
deposited with the Clerk by UDOT without order of the Court, claiming that funds 
deposited with the Clerk by UDOT pursuant to the eminent domain statute are "trust 
funds" held under Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-4, and were subject to Judicial 
Council rules, Rule 3-407(3)(F) which provides in part: 
(iii) For interest-bearing accounts established at the request of the 
litigant or by court order, an administrative fee, in an amount established by 
the Council, shall be assessed. 
UDOT did not request that the funds be deposited in an interest bearing escrow account 
nor did any of the nine defendants, none of whom could have withdrawn the money until 
resolution of the entitlements because UDOT did not specify the amounts of which it 
claimed each was entitled to under the statute and the other claimants refused to disclaim 
until as late as April 1999, although the Orders of Occupancy required that the money 
deposited be remitted to the appropriate defendants. 
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The Complaint alleged: 
That the Clerk, upon advice and direction of the Administrative Office of the 
Courts, ("AOC"), by Daniel J. Becker, ("Becker'*), refused to pay any interest, claiming 
that the interest was paid upon funds held in trust pursuant to §78-27-4 Utah Code 
Annotated and Judicial Council Rule 3-407(3)(F) and such became a deposit in a 
restricted account for the Judicial Council. 
That the AOC and Becker refused to authorize payment of interest to Security 
without a further court order. The Court denied Security's motion for the payment of 
interest. The accrued interest is being held by some officer or agent of the State of Utah, 
and held under control of some of the Defendants, who have authority and obligation to 
release the same to the Plaintiffs, and said interest or the equivalent thereof should be 
ordered to be paid to Security. 
That for similar reasons, Olson is entitled to interest on money deposited with the 
Clerk on May 20, 1997, in the sum of $139,300.00, pursuant to an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy signed May 12, 1997, to be effective when "Plaintiff herein has deposited 
with the Clerk of the Court, for the use and benefit of the defendant parties in interest 
herein, in the full dollar amount of plaintiffs approved appraisal" and to be remitted 
upon receipt to appropriate defendants. 
That for similar reasons advanced against Security, the Clerk and AOC by Becker, 
refused payment of interest to Olson, and the Court on June 30, 1999, granted Olson's 
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motion for payment of the principal deposited, however, allowing Olson to withdraw the 
principal without prejudice to the right of appeal on the interest issue. 
That Security and Olson appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in 
separate appeals, No. 990369, and No. 990652, which denied any interest claim against 
UDOT, but stated: "Moreover, we decline to address defendants' argument that the clerk 
of the court, and/or any other persons in control of the monies deposited by UDOT or 
any interest earned thereon, should pay such interest to defendant, as such persons are not 
parties to this appeal." 
That upon information and belief, the Plaintiffs allege that the Clerk and any other 
persons in control of the monies deposited by UDOT and the interest thereon, are the 
Defendants named herein, and to the extent that other persons are later to be found to be 
identified as persons in control, the Plaintiffs reserve the right to add such person or 
persons as defendants. 
That Article I Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah provides: "Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." The Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of Webber v. Salt Lake City. 40 Utah 221, 120 Pac. 503, 
(Utah 1911), holds that this constitutional provision is self-executing and required no 
legislative aid. 
That the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Webb's Fabulous 
Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155, 66 L Ed. 101, (1980), held that the county, 
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taking as its own, under authority of a Florida statute, the interest on money deposited in 
an interpleader fund, is a taking which violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution. The Court further stated that interest on the deposited 
fund follows the principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be the 
owners of that principal. 
The Supreme Court followed the holding of the Webb's case in Phillips v. 
Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), where interest on Lawyers Trust 
Account (IOLTA) by statute is paid to foundations to finance legal services for low-
income individuals. The Supreme Court held that the interest was the property of the 
client which is private property of the owner of the principal and that the taking thereof 
violates the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
That any and all of the named defendants individually or in conjunction with 
others or each other owe to the plaintiffs all interest earned on money deposited in said 
eminent domain proceedings, and to the extent that it cannot be reasonably, accurately 
calculated, then the interest should be calculated at the highest legal rate of 10% per 
annum or in any event at 8% per annum as provided by Eminent Domain statutes. 
That the Defendants violated the civil rights of the Plaintiffs by an unlawful 
taking and retaining of their respective properties without due process of law contrary to 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and their rights 
under Article I Section 22 Constitution of Utah. Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United 
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States Code provides: 
1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party inured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District 
of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of this District of Columbia. 
Plaintiffs demanded judgement against the defendants having possession and or 
control of the interest on the deposited funds. 
(1) For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned on the money deposited 
for the use and benefit of Security Investment LTD in the original principal sum of 
$292,350.00; 
(2) For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned on the money deposited 
for the use and benefit of William K. Olson in the original principal sum of $139,300.00; 
(3) For damages and attorneys fees for violation of Plaintiffs' civil rights in taking 
property by governmental action without due process of law as proved at trial; 
(4) For costs; and for other relief to which Plaintiffs may be entitled to by law. 
A copy of the Complaint is attached in the appendix. 
C. Disposition at the Trial Court. 
The Defendants-Appellees filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint supported by a 
memorandum. The Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a memorandum responding to 
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Defendants-Appellees' motion to dismiss. The trial court heard arguments of the parties 
and subsequently issued a "Ruling on Defendants' Motion To Dismiss," granting the 
Defendant-Appellees' motion to dismiss based upon the "findings" as follows: 
1. The State of Utah and the Administrative Office of the Courts, and 
defendants Brown, Alter and Becker in their official capacities, are not 
"persons" under 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
2. Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite affirmative causal link 
between the actions of the defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 
3. Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the UDOT interest funds at 
issue. Having no property right, there was no unconstitutional taking of 
plaintiffs' property, and therefore no violation of plaintiffs' constitutional 
rights. 
4. Defendants Brown and Becker are entitled to quasi-judicial and qualified 
immunity. 
5. Defendant Alter is entitled to qualified immunity. 
6. The Court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The relevant facts have been stated in the STATEMENT OF THE CASE, and 
since there was no evidentiary hearing, no other facts were developed. Since the 
disposition in the trial court was a judgment of dismissal for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, the allegations of the Complaint must be construed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
plaintiff. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v. 
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Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
The trial court was construing legal issues for the most part and the factual 
allegations were not disputed as acknowledged by the trial court in its RULING ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Funds deposited pursuant to eminent domain proceeding are not "trust funds" as 
defined in the statute governing money, deposited in court to be held in trust. Interest on 
money deposited in eminent domain proceedings is part of "just compensation" mandated 
by the constitution of the United States, The State of Utah and by statute to be paid the 
Plaintiff who are entitled to the principal. 
2. Eminent domain deposits are not the type of deposits defined by Rule 3-407(3) 
Administration of the Judiciary as "Trust Accounts" which include restitution, child 
support and bail amounts. Interest thereon was never intended by the rule to be 
appropriated by the state. The rule of ejusdem generis would limit the court rule to the 
types on deposits which are similar to the examples. 
3. Article I Section 7, Constitution of Utah requires due process of law in 
condemnations, and Section 22 prohibits a taking without just compensation. Section 78-
34-9 Utah Code Annotated states that "judgment shall include, as part of the just 
compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally 
awarded as the value of the property and damages " 
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The appropriation of interest on principal deposited pursuant to eminent domain 
proceedings by the State, violates the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and violates the civil rights of the Plaintiffs by an unlawful 
taking of their respective properties without due process of law contrary to the provisions 
of the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments of the United States Constitutions. 
4. Requiring a forfeiture of interest on the statutory entitlement is in effect a tax 
imposed by the judiciary without authority to tax. 
5. Civil fees are set by statute, not by the courts. The legislature is to establish 
fees collected by all offices. As an involuntary defendant-landowner in eminent domain 
proceedings, Plaintiffs should not be assessed costs which forfeits their right to interest, 
doubling their sacrifice to public necessity. 
6. Under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution and The Governmental 
Immunity Act §63-30-10.5, Defendants are not immune from suit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TAKING BY THE DEFENDANTS OF INTEREST ON PRINCIPAL 
DEPOSITED IN THE EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS VIOLATES THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
The allegations of the Complaint raise issues of taking private property in violation of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and violate Plaintiffs' 
civil rights by an unlawful taking of their respective properties without due process of law 
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contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and their 
rights under Article I Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah. 
We review two decisions of the United States Supreme Court as being the law 
determinative of the issues in the instant case. The first case is Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. 
Inc.. et aL v. Beckwith. 449 US 155, 66 L. Ed 2d 358, 101 S. Ct. 446 (1980), where on certiorari, 
the United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of Florida because the taking of 
interest on funds deposited with the clerk of the court was a taking which violated the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Eckerd's of College Park, Inc. agreed 
to purchase for over $1.8 million, substantially all of the assets of Webb's. At closing Webb's 
debts appeared to be greater than the purchase price. Eckerds filed a complaint in the 
interpleader joining Webb's and two hundred of Webb's creditors, and tendering the purchase 
price to the court which ordered the tendered amount to be paid to the clerk to be deposited "in 
an assignable interest-bearing account at the highest interest." The court reserved decision on 
interest entitlement without prejudice to creditors' claim to the interest. The interest earned 
totaled more than $100,000.00 of which the clerk retained $9,228.74 as his fee. The court 
appointed a receiver and directed the clerk to pay the accumulated interest to the receiver for the 
creditors. The clerk appealed to the Supreme Court stating that the deposited fund is "public 
money" and that the Florida statute takes only what it creates and there is no unconstitutional 
taking because interest earned on the clerk's registry account is not private property. The holding 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in comment [8] is as follows: 
Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial decree, may 
accomplish the result the county seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as "public 
money" because it is held temporarily by the court. The earnings of a fund are incidents 
of ownership of the fund itself and are property just as the fund itself is property. The 
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state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the value of the use of 
the fund for the period in which it is held in the registry. 
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into 
public property without compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in 
court. This is the very kind of thing that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was 
meant to prevent. That Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental 
power. 
IV 
[lc] We hold that under the narrow circumstances of this case—where there is a 
separate and distinct state statute authorizing a clerk's fee "for services rendered" based 
upon the amount of principal deposited; where the deposited fund itself concededly is 
private; and where the deposit in the court's registry is required by state statute in order 
for the depositor to avail itself of statutory protection from claims of creditors and others-
-Seminole County's taking unto itself, under § 28.33 and 1973 Fla Laws, ch 73-282. the 
interest earned on the interpleader fluid while it was in the registry of the court was a 
taking violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We express no view as to the 
constitutionality of a statute that prescribes a county's retention of interest earned, where 
the interest would be the only return to the county for services it renders. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida is reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
In both the Olson and Security cases the Order of Immediately Occupancy in compliance 
with the statute provided the following: 
"This Order shall not be effective until the Plaintiff herein has deposited with the Clerk of 
the Court, for the use and benefit of the Defendant parties in interest herein, the fiill dollar 
amount of Plaintiffs approved appraisal of the Defendants' property to be acquired in this action. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on receipt of said moneys, the Clerk of this Court shall 
remit the same to the appropriate Defendants in the percentage and portion to which each is 
entitled." 
It is clear that the money deposited with the Clerk in these eminent domain proceedings 
was for just compensation and was never public money or trust funds. 
The second pertinent decision of the United States Supreme Court which cites with 
approval the Webb's case is Phillips et al. v. Washington Legal Foundation et al.. 524 U.S. 156 
14 
(1998). Under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) program, an attorney who 
receives client funds must place them in a separate, interest-bearing, federally authorized "NOW 
account upon determining that the funds "could not reasonably be expected to earn interest for 
the client or [that] the interest which might be earned is not likely to be sufficient to offset the 
cost of establishing and maintaining the account, service charges, accounting costs and tax 
reporting costs which would be incurred in attempting to obtain the interest." IOLTA interest 
income is paid to the Texas Equal Access to Justice Foundation (TEAJF), which finances legal 
services for low-income persons. An attorney and his client sued TEAJF and others alleging that 
the Texas IOLTA program violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment which provides that 
private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation. The district court 
granted summary judgment to TEAJF which was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court whose 
opinion was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The holding of the United States Supreme Court is 
summarized in the syllabus as: 
Interest earned on client funds held in IOLTA accounts is the "private property" of the 
client for Takings Clause purposes. The existence of a property interest is determined by 
reference to existing rules or understandings stemming from an independent source such 
as state law. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577. All agree 
that under Texas law the principal held in IOLTA accounts is the client's "private 
property." Moreover, the general rule that "interest follows principal" applies in Texas. 
See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155,162. Id at 
A. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PERFECT A PROPERTY RIGHT IN A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERFECTED AND PROTECTED RIGHT. 
The trial court's judgment of dismissal of the claim for interest stated: 
3. Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the UDOT interest 
funds at issue. Having no property right, there was no unconstitutional 
taking of plaintiffs' property, and therefore no violation of plaintiffs' 
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constitutional rights. 
The Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges: 
13. Article I Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Webber v. Salt Lake City. 
40 Utah 221, at 224, 120 Pac. 503, (Utah 1911), holds that this 
constitutional provision is self-executing and required no legislative aid. 
The Webber decision further states that since the action was based upon a constitutional 
provision, a statute of limitations of one year created by statute was not applicable and a 
four year statute was applicable. See Webber at 224-225. A statute cannot diminish a 
constitutional right. 
Therefore, there was no necessity for the Plaintiffs in this action to "perfect" a 
property right in the UDOT interest funds, in that the constitution perfected and protected 
that right. 
The Webber decision further explained at 224: 
As we have pointed out, the constitutional provision existed when 
section 282 was adopted. Moreover, the right to recover damages would 
continue precisely the same, although section 282 were repealed. If a right 
or liability — call it what you will — therefore, existed before section 282 
was adopted, such right or liability was not created by that section. Again, 
if the right or liability will continue in full force and effect, although that 
section were repealed, such right is not even exercised by virtue of that 
section. In other words, for the purposes of an action like the one at bar, 
the provisions of section 282 are not controlling or even material. 
From what has been said, it follows that this action is not based 
upon section 282. Even though it be conceded, therefore, that the 
provisions of subdivision 1 of section 2877, supra, are applicable to section 
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282, yet, as this action is based upon the constitutional provision to which 
we have referred, this action is not affected by section 2877. 
B. CAN THE STATE RETAIN INTEREST EARNED ON PRINCIPAL 
BELONGING TO A PRIVATE PARTY IN VIOLATION OF THE FIFTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The Complaint cites two United States Supreme Court cases which hold that the 
taking by the State of interest earned on principal belonging to a private party is a taking 
which violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 66 L Ed 2d 101 (1980); 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation. 524 U.S. 156 (1998). 
Earlier Supreme Court cases confirming Plaintiffs' right to interest as a part of just 
compensation cited to the trial court are as follows: 
United States v. Rogers. 255 U.S. 163, 168-170 (1920) required the United States 
government to deposit interest at 6 % per annum and to pay the same because this was 
not a claim against the United States as such but "Having taken the lands of the 
defendants in error, it was the duty of the government to make just compensation as of 
the time the owners were deprived of their property." 
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U.S.. 261 U.S. 299 (1923) cited the Rogers case at page 
305 and held at page 305,~"Just compensation is provided for by the Constitution and the 
right to it cannot be taken away by statute."... "The owner's right does not depend on 
contract, express or implied. A promise to pay is not necessary." 
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United States v. Worley. 281 U.S. 339, (19 ) states, "An implied agreement to 
pay interest arises upon taking by the United States of private property for public use 
where interest is an element of just compensation guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v. United States." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Seigel v. Salt Lake City. Cottonwood, Etc.. 655 P.2d 
662, 669 (Utah 1982) held that it was error for the trial court not to allow interest at 8% 
per annum as part of just compensation provided by §78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated. 
Seaboard Air Lines Ry v. United States supra also stated: "The requirement that 
'just compensation' shall be paid is comprehensive and includes all elements and no 
specific command to include interest is necessary when interest or its equivalent is a part 
of such compensation." 
A recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Anthony 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, et al.. No. 99-2047 decided June 28, 2001, reversed the 
decision of the Rhode Island State Supreme Court which held that Palazzolo had no right 
to challenge regulations predating his acquisition of title to real property which prevented 
his development of the property under the regulations restricting use of coastal wetlands. 
The Court held: 
The State's rule would work a critical alteration to the nature of 
property, as the newly regulated landowner is stripped of the ability to 
transfer the interest which was possessed prior to the regulation. The State 
may not by this means secure a windfall for itself. See Webb's Fabulous 
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164, 66 L. Ed. 2d 358, 101 S. 
Ct. 446 (1980) ("[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private 
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property into public property without compensation"); cf. Ellickson, 
Property in Land, 102 Yale L. J. 73/5, 1368-1369 (1993) (right to transfer 
interest in land is a defining characteristic of the fee simple estate). The 
proposed rule is, furthermore, capricious in effect. The young owner 
contrasted with the older owner, the owner with the resources to hold 
contrasted with the ownei with the need to sell, would be in different 
positions. The Takings Clause is not so quixotic. A blanket rule that 
purchasers with notice have no compensation right when a claim becomes 
ripe is too blunt an instrument to accord with the duty to compensate for 
what is taken. 
The Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies. Inc. v. Beckwith. 449 U.S. 155, 66 L. Ed. 2d 
358, 101 S. Ct. 446 (1980) decision stated the rule that: 
Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida courts by 
judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county seeks simply by 
recharacterizing the principal as "public money" because it is held 
temporarily by the court. The earnings of a fund are incidents of ownership 
of the ftind itself and are property just as the fund itself is property. The 
state statute has the practical effect of appropriating for the county the 
value of the use of the fluid for the period in which it is held in the registry. 
To put it another way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform 
private property into public property without compensation, even for the 
limited duration of the deposit in court. This is the very kind of thing that 
the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent. That 
Clause stands as a shield against the arbitrary use of governmental power. 
Applying the holdings of the United States Supreme Court in Palazzolo and Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies to the Security and Olson claims, the state statute §78-27-4 UCA 
and Judicial Council Rule 3-407(3)(F) cannot deprive Security and Olson of just 
compensation including interest which is mandated by Utah and United States 
Constitutions which predate the statutes and regulations and were self executing. 
Security and Olson were entitled to interest as provided by §78-34-9(5)(c)(i) as 
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part of just compensation awarded, at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally 
awarded as value of the property from the date of actual possession of the property by 
UDOT or the date of the order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of 
judgment. Since interest was not due and payable until the date of judgment, no claim to 
interest could be made by Security and Olson until after the date of judgment. Security 
and Olson made request prior to the date of judgment for interest from both the 
Administrative Office of the Courts and the District Court. No payment of interest has 
been made and apparently the District Court and the Administrative Office of the Court 
rely upon statutes and regulations as a basis for denial of the prior constitutional right to 
interest. 
It is undisputed that the state has taken the interest which was due from the date of 
judgment. Olson and Security had no obligation to request interest either before or after 
judgment because the federal and state constitutions provided that right without 
restriction or reservation. UDOT and the District Court would not release the money 
deposited by UDOT until determination of entitlement among multiple defendants was 
concluded. The State of Utah through its agencies withheld the money deposited. No 
one else benefitted or could benefit from the money so deposited. The party who claims 
to be entitled to be relieved from payment of interest on money deposited should be the 
party required to comply with any administrative rules which relieve it from payment of 
interest. In this case, the State of Utah is the party claiming for itself the interest which it 
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is obligated to pay to the condemnees. As stated in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, the 
"State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without 
compensation, even for the limited duration of the deposit in court" because this is 
prevented by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which 
is a shield against arbitrary use of governmental power. Olson and Security had no duty 
or obligation to perfect an entitlement to interest by some regulatory request where that 
entitlement was mandated by Constitution. See Hayden v. Board of Cty. Commissioners, 
580 P.2d 830, 834 (Colo 1978), Utah County v. Brown. 672 P.2d 83, 86 (Utah 1983). 
Also, no notice or claim is necessary in condemnation action to recover just 
compensation. Bennett v. Bow Valley Development Corp., 797 P.2d 419, (Utah 1990); 
Wilson v. Beville. 306 P.2d 789, (Cal 1957). 
POINT II. DEFENDANTS ARE NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT. 
The Governmental Immunity Act §63-30-10.5 provides: 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity from 
suit of all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from 
the governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property for public uses without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of 
Title 78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
Article I, Section 22 is also self executing. The Supreme Court in William J. Colman v. 
Utah State Land Board: Ralph Miles. Director Utah Division of State Lands et aL 795 
P.2d 622, 635 (1990) stated: 
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In sum, article I, section 22 needs no legislation to activate it; it is mandatory 
and obligatory as it is. See Utah Const. Art I, §24. 
The trial court concluded that Southern Pacific acted as the State's contractor on 
the causeway breach project and was therefore protected by the State's immunity. 
Since we hold that the State is not immune, Southern Pacific can no longer 
depend on the State's immunity. 
See also Hamblin v. City of Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990) where the city was 
not immune for damages accruing after a flood; and Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 
P.2d 838, 847 (Utah 1990) where the County was not immune from an inverse 
condemnation claim because Article I Section 22 creates this claim. 
Since the statute specifically provides that interest is a part of just compensation, 
there can be no immunity of any defendants from suit for interest withheld as well as the 
continuing acts under color of statute and rules depriving Plaintiffs of just compensation. 
The law is clear by the Supreme Court decisions reviewed above that Plaintiffs should be 
paid the interest withheld, and the continued refusal of the Defendants is a clear violation 
of § 1983 for which they have no immunity. 
POINT III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CASES 
WHERE ANOTHER STATUTE OR THE CONSTITUTION ALLOWS SUIT. 
Cases; Adkins v. Div. Of State Lands. 719 P.2d 523 (Utah 1986) 
Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990) 
El Rancho Enterprises v. Murray Citv Corp.. 565 P.2d 778 (Utah 1977) 
Bennett v. Bow Vallev Development Corp.. 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990) 
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Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990) 
POINT IV. PLAINTIFFS WERE PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
The Plaintiffs5 claims for interest as a part of just compensation having its basis in 
the Constitutions of the United States and Utah are not subject to the notice and other 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Since the claims under § 1983 may be subject to the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, the Plaintiffs have, on February 7, 2001 served an additional notice upon the 
Defendants and offered to deposit $300.00 as specified in the act. (The Plaintiffs already 
had on deposit with the Clerk of this Court $300.00 each in connection with the previous 
appeal to which Plaintiffs were entitled to a refund). 
We review now the cases on entitlement to interest as part of just compensation, 
even though the statute specifically so states. The early United States Supreme court 
cases, which have never been contradicted aire as follows. 
Beginning with United States v. Roger. 255 U.S. 163, 168-170 (1920), the 
Supreme Court held that the United States could not be required to pay interest before 
possession, however even in absence of statute, the United States was required to deposit 
interest at 6% per annum and pay the same because this was not a claim against the 
United States as such but "Having taken the lands of the defendants in error, it was the 
duty of the government to make just compensation as of the time when the owners were 
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deprived of their property." 
In 1923, the United States Supreme Court in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. U.S.. 261 
U.S. 299, Justice Butler cited the Rogers case (p. 305) and held at page 304: 
Section 10 of the Lever Act authorizes the taking of property for the public use 
on payment of just compensation. There is no provision in respect of interest. 
Just compensation is provided for by the Constitution and the right to it cannot be 
taken away by statute. Its ascertainment is a judicial function. Monongahela 
Navigation Co. v. United States. 148 U.S. 312, 327. 
The compensation to which the owner is entitled is the full and perfect 
equivalent of the property taken.... It rests on equitable principles and it means 
substantially that the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as he 
would have been if his property had not been taken. United States v. Rogers 
(C.C.A., Eighth Circuit), 257 Fed. 397, 400. He is entitled to the damages 
inflicted by the taking. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. North American Telegraph 
Co. (C.C.A., Eighth Circuit), 230 Fed. 347, 352, and cases there cited. 
The United States in effect claims that the owner is entitled to no more than the 
value of the land, as of date of taking, to be paid at a later time, when ascertained. 
The owner has been deprived of the land and its use since the taking, May 23, 
1919. The value of the property, as ascertained by the President, was $235.80, 
and this was allowed with interest from date of taking. But as judicially 
determined later, the value when taken was $6,000. 
The owner's right does not depend on contract express or implied. A promise 
to pay is not necessary. 
(Emphasis added). 
In 1930, Justice Butler's opinion in United States v. Worley. 281 U.S. 339 which 
involved a disability claim in which interest was claimed on installments denied payment 
of interest but contrasted the case with just compensation cases citing the Seaboard Air 
Line Ry. case stating: 
The rule is that the United States will not be required to pay interest except 
where the liability is imposed by statute or assumed by contract. An implied 
agreement to pay interest arises upon a taking by the United States of private 
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property for public use where interest is an element in the just compensation 
guaranteed by the Constitution. Seaboard Air line Ry. v. United States. 
The foregoing cases make it abundantly clear that interest in eminent domain 
proceediiigs is founded upon just compensation and cannot be diminished or taken away 
by statute. The Utah Supreme Court in Siegel v. Salt Lake City. Cottonwood. Etc.. 655 
P.2d 662, 664 (Utah 1982) held: 
[3] Finally, Siegel contends that the trial court committed error in not awarding 
interest on the damages awarded. Section 78-34-9 provides that in an award of 
damages for taking in eminent domain the "judgment shall include, as part of the 
just compensation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount 
finally awarded as the value of the property and damages, from the date of taking 
actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is 
earlier." 
The evidence is that the Sanitary District's entry into SiegeFs premises occurred 
on November 19, 1976. It follows as a matter of law that he is entitled to interest 
on his award from that date at 8% per annum as provided in the statute just 
quoted. 
Remanded for modification of the judgment to conform with this opinion. No 
costs. 
POINT V. NOTWITHSTANDING THE FOREGOING CONSTITUTIONAL 
REASONING TO REQUIRE PAYMENT OF INTEREST TO PLAINTIFFS, 
THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULE WAS NEVER INTENDED TO APPLY TO 
INTEREST EARNED ON PRINCIPAL DEPOSITED IN EMINENT DOMAIN 
CASES. 
In support of this point, the arguments advanced in a previous appeal by Olson in 
Supreme Court No. 990652SC are restated. 
A. JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES EXCLUDE THE SUBJECT INTEREST BY 
DEFINITION. 
Eminent domain deposits are clearly excluded from the Judicial Council rules by 
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definition. 
Rule 3-407(3) Trust accounts, contains the following definition: 
"(3) Trust accounts. 
(A) Definition. Trust accounts are accounts established by the courts for the 
benefit of third parties. Examples of funds which are held in trust accounts include 
restitution, child support, and bail amount." 
Eminent domain deposits have no similarity to the examples stated, and none of 
the examples are required by statute to be deposited. As stated in W.S. Hatch Co. v 
Public Service Commission. 3 Utah 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809 (Utah 1954), "Another 
universally accepted rule which is brought to assistance in arriving at the intention 
manifest in written documents is that of fejusdem generis1 meaning 'of the same kind1 
which rule is stated thus: When general words or terms follow specific ones, the general 
must be understood as applying to things of the same kind as the specific". Id. at 11. 
Another leading case on ejusdem generis which has been cited in several following 
Utah decisions is that ofHeathmanv Giles. 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839 (Utah 1962). 
In Heathman, Justice Crockett wrote: 
[1] When there is doubt or uncertainty as to the interpretation of a statute 
there are two well-known rules of statutory construction which are helpful. 
The rule of noscitur a sociis, literally "it is known from its associates," 
requires that the meaning of doubtful words or phrases be determined in the 
light of and take their character from associated words or phrases. 
Sutherland in his treatise on Statutory Construction states:"... where two 
or more words are grouped together and ordinarily have a similar meaning, 
but are not equally comprehensive, the general words will be limited and 
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qualified by the special words." 
[2] Another closely related rule which is universally accepted as valid is 
that of ejusdem generis, meaning "of the same kind." which rule is that: 
when general words or terms follow specific ones, the general must be 
understood as applying to things of the same kind as the specific. 
These are, of course, neither artificial nor arbitrary rules but arise 
quite naturally from the process or reasoning as to what the statute was 
intended to mean. Common sense and experience teach that when a group 
of related things are specifically enumerated, the mind is focused upon that 
class of things, and that the addition of general terms is purposed to avoid 
inadvertent omission and to include like things of the same class. In accord 
with this is the fact that if the broadest meaning of the general expression 
were intended, it would have been sufficient by itself without any use of the 
specific terms. 
374P.2dat40. 
Heathman was cited and followed in subsequent cases: Matter of Disconnection of 
Certain Territory 698 P.2d 544,547-548 (Utah 1983) (Justice Oaks); Nephi City v 
Hansen, 779 P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989) (Justice Zimmerman); and State v Vogt 824 P.2d 
455, 458 (Utah App. 1991) (Judge Russon). 
It appears that the intention of the provisions relating to deposit of trust funds was 
to cover costs of administering non-mandated funds such as restitution, child support and 
bail, which can be ordered by the court but which are not mandated by law. See Section 
78-27-4(3)(b) Utah Code Annotated. The amount of interest which could be forfeited by 
Plaintiffs far exceeds costs in that if earned interest is only 5% per annum, not 
compounded, when applied to $292,350.00 for Security, annual interest is $14,617.50. 
For the period August 14, 1997 through April 23, 1999, a term of twenty (20) months, 
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interest at 5% would amount to $24,358.00. When applied to $139,300.00 for Olson, to 
an annual interest is $6,965.00. For the period May 27, 1997 through July 26, 1999, a 
term of twenty-six (26) months, interest at 5% would amount to $16,913.78. 
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF INTEREST ON DEPOSITS IS IN EFFECT AN 
UNAUTHORIZED TAX. 
Article XIII Section 2(1) Constitution of Utah provides: 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
in proportion to its value, to be ascertained by law. 
Money on deposit has never been taxed, nor have trust funds been taxed, presumably 
because deposits of money and trust funds are not tangible property. In any event, if such 
taxes were authorized by the constitution, the same are required to be uniform and equal. 
Taxing only trust funds1 interest on money deposited in court, but not taxing deposits and 
trust funds generally, violates the uniform and equal constitutional requirements. 
We quote from the opinion Smith v. Carbon County. 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259, 
108 ALR 513 (1936) where the main issue was whether a statute requiring payment of a 
fee for filing an inventory and appraisement in an estate, graduated to the value of the 
estate. The Court held in part as follows: 
[1] The first question which presents itself for determination is: Do the 
various amounts enumerated in the foregoing scheduled in excess of $10 
constitute a fee or tax? The mere fact that the Legislature has characterized 
them as fees is not controlling if the burden sought to be imposed on estates 
is devoid of the essential characteristics of a fee. The adjudicated cases 
define the fee of an officer as "reward or compensation allowed by law to 
an officer for specific services performed by him in the discharge of his 
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official duties." If the amount required to be paid upon the filing of an 
inventory and appraisement to the county clerk may reasonably be said to be 
in payment for services rendered in probate proceedings, the objections to 
the act based upon article 13, sections 2, 3 and 5 of our State Constitution 
must fail. The converse is equally true; that is to say, if the amount required 
to be paid in a given case for filing an inventory and appraisement does not 
bear some reasonable relation to the extent and kind of services required to 
be performed, the money so required to be paid, no matter how it is 
characterized by the Legislature, may not be said to be a fee. Defendant 
does not contend to the contrary. It does contend that the services required 
from a clerk and judge in probate proceedings are, in the main, in 
proportion to the appraised value of the estate, that the more valuable the 
estate the greater the time required of the clerk and judge in the probate 
thereof. Defendant also contends that the responsibility of the judge and the 
clerk increases in proportion as the value of the estate being probated 
increases. Because of such facts, so it is urged by defendant, the different 
amounts required to be paid for filing an inventory and appraisement may 
properly be held to be fees. If the premise assumed by defendant as the 
basis for its argument is in fact true, there would be merit to its contention. 
Experience, however, teaches us that the amount of service required in a 
probate proceeding of the clerk and judge do not depend upon the appraised 
value of the estate being probated, but rather upon such matters as the 
number of heirs, legatees, or devisees, the number of creditors, the character 
of the property being probated, number of sales of property sought in the 
probate proceedings, etc. Nor are we impressed with the argument that the 
extent of responsibility assumed by the clerk and judge becomes greater as 
the value of the estate is increased. Neither the judge nor the clerk is 
charged with the actual management, custody, or control of the property of 
the estate. Those duties are performed by the administrator or executor. 
The clerk's duties are confined to filing and preserving the paper filed, 
giving the required notices, etc. The duty and responsibility is the same 
whether the estate be of great or little value. Nor may it be said that the 
responsibility of the judge to perform his duties, as by law provided, is 
enhanced because, in a given matter, the estate in which he is acting is of 
great value. The judge and clerk are each paid a fixed salary. The amount 
of such salary is not dependent on the size of the estate probated in the court 
in which they are officers. The arguments here made in support of the view 
that provisions such as those here brought in question may be sustained as 
fees have ben before the courts of a number of jurisdictions. The cases to 
which our attention has been called are uniform in holding that statutory 
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provisions fixing, in probate proceedings, a schedule of fees increasing as 
the appraised value of the estate increases, have held that such fees in 
excess of the minimum provided for, are in contemplation of law, not fees, 
but taxes. From what we said, we do not wish to be understood as holding 
that the Legislature must fix fees payable in all probate proceedings the 
same. What we do hold is that the amount of fees that may be exacted must 
bear some reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the services 
rendered. Otherwise such fees are, in contemplation of law, taxes. That 
being taxes, they must be uniform and may not be levied by the Legislature 
for the use and benefit of a county. It follows that the law fixing the 
schedule of fees attacked in this action must fail because in conflict with the 
constitutional provisions relied upon by plaintiff. 
(citations omitted). 
Id. at 260. The rationale of the Smith v. Carbon County appears to support appellant's 
claim that the interest appropriation is an unlawful tax which neither the legislature nor 
the courts may impose and collect. 
C. CIVIL FEES ARE TO BE SET BY STATUTE NOT BY COURT RULE. 
Assuming that a fee may be charged for services in handling trust funds, the same 
are to be set by statute. Article XXII Section 2, Constitution of Utah provides for the 
legislature to establish fees collected by all officers. The legislature is restricted in 
delegation of its power by Article V Section 1 of the Utah Constitution which divides 
powers into three distinct departments, the Legislative, Executive, and the Judicial. No 
person charged with exercise of power properly belonging to one of these departments, 
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others. Rule 3 -407(F) (iii) 
demands a fee in an amount "established by the Council". 
D. THE RATES FOR CHARGES FOR SERVICES IN TRUST FUNDS 
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ESTABLISHED BY THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ARE THE INITIAL 
INDICATION OF THE COSTS RELATED THERETO. 
Assuming that the charges established by the Judicial Council pursuant to Rule 3-
407(F)(iii) are an indication of the extent of charges to be exacted from litigants, the 
actual charges to Security resulting from the forfeiture of interest far exceed the schedule 
of charges established by the rule. 
The Clerk of the District Court of Davis County has provided information on rates 
established by the Council as being a $50.00 minimum, or 0.647% of the principal 
amount deposited. 
In the instant case, the amount on deposit by UDOT was $292,350.00. 0.647% of 
$292,350.00 is the sum of $1,891.50 which is almost 37 times greater than the minimum 
of $50.00, and as such appears to be excessive under the principles set forth in Smith v. 
Carbon County. 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259, 108 ALR 513 (1936). Adding further to the 
disparate charges as it relates to the cost of service, in this case if Security is required to 
forfeit interest earned at an assumed rate of five percent per annum, they will have been 
charged, and forfeited twenty months of interest (August 14, 1997 to April 23, 1999). 
Five percent per annum equals 0.4167 per month resulting in a forfeiture of interest of 
$24,360.00. (0.4167 x $292,350.00 = $1,218.00 x 20 = $24,360.00). Aside from the 
legal reasons reviewed above, it is doubtful that the Judicial Council ever considered the 
charges to apply to eminent domain proceedings. 
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POINT VI. THE TRUSTEE OF AN INVOLUNTARY TRUST SHOULD BE NO 
LESS TRUSTED THAN OTHER FIDUCIARIES. 
Lawyers should agree that no special citations are needed to expect a trustee of 
public funds to be just as responsible for protecting the assets of the true beneficiary as is 
expected of all trustees. 
Here we have the statute requiring a deposit in eminent domain for the use and 
benefit of the ultimate owner who is entitled to eight percent interest on all non-deposited 
damages, and such owner is confronted by subsequent statutes and rules which would 
appropriate interest to the use of the Trustee. No where in the statute does there appear 
the right of anyone but the owner to receive the interest "as part of the just compensation 
awarded." Apart from other legal considerations, this does not seem appropriate conduct 
for persons trained in law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should remand the case to the District Court to determine the interest 
earned on money deposited in this case, and to order the clerk and other parties in control 
of the funds to pay the earned interest to the Plaintiffs to avoid unfair double sacrifice by 
Plaintiffs as an involuntary defendant-landowner surrendering land for public necessity 
and receiving less than just compensation. Since eminent domain is based upon public 
necessity, let the public pay to manage the funds. 
This Court could resolve the controversy by deciding that the Judicial Council did 
32 
not intend that its rule apply to principal deposited in eminent domain proceedings. 
Respectfully Submitted 
rge K. Fader 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs-Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that on the (/ day of October, 2001 
I mailed two copies of Appellants' Brief to Mr. Scott D. Cheney, 
Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, 
Mail Stop 140856, Salt Lake City, Utah/84114-0856. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, and WILLIAM 
K. OLSON, individually and BILL 
OLSON INVESTMENT LTD, a Utah 
limited partnership, by William K. 
Olson, General Partner, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ALLYSON BROWN, Clerk of the Second 
Judicial District Court, Farmington 
Utah; The STATE OF UTAH by and 
through its state treasurer, 
WILLIAM T. ALTER; its Administra-
tive Office of the Courts, DANIEL 
J. BECKER, Administrator, and THE 
STATE OF UTAH, by any officer or 
agency receiving interest on funds 
deposited in courts, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs complain of the defendants and for causes of action 
allege: 
1. Security Investment LTD (Security) is a Utah limited 
partnership named as a defendant in an eminent domain action in the 
above-entitled court, Civil No. 970700108, wherein Utah Department 
of Transportation (UDOT) is names as plaintiff. 
2. William K. Olson (Olson) was named as William K. Olsen in 
an eminent domain action in the above-entitled court, Civil No. 
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COMPLAINT 
civil no.OVQ^IQI;^ 5J 
Judge: fAOi^ 
97070014, The property which was condemned is also referred to as 
property of Bill Olson Investment LTD, William K. Olson, General 
partner, the present real property in interest. UDOT is the 
condemnor named as plaintiff in said action. 
3. Jurisdiction of this Court is provided by Section 78-3-
4(1) Utah Code Annotated. 
4. Allyson Brown (Clerk) is the Clerk of the Second Judicial 
District Court, Farmington, Utah. 
5. The legal issues regarding the claims of Security and 
Olson are identical and both arose in connection with the same road 
project for which UDOT commenced eminent domain proceedings to 
acquire portions of the tracts of the plaintiffs. 
6. On or about August 19, 1997, UDOT paid $290,600 to the 
Clerk of the above-entitled court pursuant to Section 78-34-9 Utah 
Code Annotated, and the Order of Occupying dated August 14, 1997 
provided that: "IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that on receipt of said 
moneys, the Clerk of this Court shall remit the same to the 
appropriate Defendants in the percentage and proportion to which 
each is entitled." 
There were eight other entities named as Defendants, none of 
whom were entitled to any^percentage or portion of the deposited 
funds, although some laid claims to entitlement, which claims were 
finally rejected by the Court by Summary Judgment For Payment of 
Funds On Deposit to Security Investment LTD entered April 22, 1999, 
"awarding to Security Investment LTD all funds available as just 
compensation herein." It was further ordered that the Clerk pay 
2 
the funds on deposit in the sum of $292,350.00 to Securityf stating 
that the acceptance by Security Investment LTD of the funds 
deposited is without prejudice to any action which it may take with 
respect to the determination of its entitlement to any interest on 
money deposited with the Clerk, whether such action is by appeal 
or by such other remedy as is available. 
7. The Clerkf upon advice and direction of the Administrative 
Office of The Courts, (AOC) refused to pay any interestf claiming 
that the interest was paid upon funds held in trust pursuant to 
Section 78-27-4, UCA and Judicial Council Rule 3-407(3)(F) and as 
such became a deposit in a restricted account for the Judicial 
Council. 
8. The AOC refused to authorize payment of interest to 
Security without a further court order. The Court denied 
Security's motion for the payment of interest. The accrued 
interest is being held by some officer or agent of the State of 
Utahf or held under control of some of the defendants and said 
interest or the equivalent thereof should be ordered to be paid to 
Security. 
9. For similar reasons, Olson is entitled to interest on 
money deposited with the Clerk on May 20, 1997r in the sum of 
$139,300.00, pursuant to an Order of Immediate Occupancy signed May 
12, 1997, to be effective when "Plaintiff herein has deposited with 
the Clerk of the Courtf for the use and benefit of the defendant 
parties in interest herein, in the full dollar amount of 
plaintiff's approved appraisal" and to be remitted upon receipt to 
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appropriate defendants. 
10. For similar reasons advanced against Securityf the Clerk 
and AOC refused payment of interest to Olson and the Court on June 
30f 1999, granted Olson's motion for payment of the principal 
deposited, howeverf allowing Olson to withdraw the principal 
without prejudice to the right of appeal on the interest issue. 
11. Security and Olson appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah in separate appeals, No. 990369, and No. 990652, 
which denied any interest claim against UD0Tf but stated: 
"Moreover, we decline to address defendants1 argument that the 
clerk of court, and/or any other persons in control of the monies 
deposited by UDOT or any interest earned thereon, should pay such 
interest to defendants, as such persons are not parties to this 
appeal." 
12. Upon information and belief the plaintiffs allege that 
the Clerk and any other persons in control of the monies deposited 
by UDOT and the interest thereon, are the defendants named herein, 
and to the extent that other persons are later to be found to be 
identified as persons in control, the plaintiffs reserve the right 
to add such person or persons as defendants herein. 
13. Article I Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Webber v. Salt Lake 
City, 40 Utah 221, 120 Pac. 503, (Utah 1911), holds that this 
constitutional provision is self-executing and required no 
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legislative aid. 
14. The Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 66 L 
Ed. 2d 101, (1980), held that the county, taking as its own, under 
authority of a Florida statute, the interest on money deposited in 
an interpleader fund, is a taking violative of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Court 
further stated that interest on the deposited fund follows the 
principal and is to be allocated to those who are ultimately to be 
the owners of that principal. 
The Supreme Court followed the holding of the Webb's case in 
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), where 
interest on Lawyers Trust Account (IOLTA) by statute is paid to 
foundations to finance legal services for low-income individuals. 
The Supreme Court held that the interest was the property of the 
client which is private property of the owner of the principal and 
that the taking thereof is violative of the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
15. Any and all of the named defendants individually or in 
conjunction with others or each other owe to the plaintiffs all 
interest earned on money deposited in said eminent domain 
proceedings, and to the extent that it cannot be reasonably, 
accurately calculated, then the interest should be calculated at 
the highest legal rate of 10% per annum or in any event at 8% per 
annum as provided by Eminent Domain statutes. 
16. The Defendants have violated the civil rights of the 
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Plaintiffs by an unlawful taking of their respective properties 
without due process of law contrary to the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution and their rights under 
Article I Section 22 Constitution of Utah, Section 1983 of Title 
42 of the United States Code provides: 
1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for injured 
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any 
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District 
of Columbia. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs demand judgement against the defendants 
having possession and or control of the interest on the deposited 
funds. 
(1) For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned 
on the money deposited for the use and benefit of Security 
Investment LTD in the original principal sum of $292,350.00; 
(2) For accrued interest and interest upon interest earned 
on the money deposited for the use and benefit of William K. olson 
in the original principal sum of $139,300.00; 
(3) For damages and attorneys fees for violation of 
plaintiffs' civil rights in taking property by governmental action 
without due process of law as proved at trial; 
(4) For costs; and 
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(5) For such other relief as the plaintiff's may be entitled 
to by law. 
Dated this jH day of December, 2000. 
I- / iii/M:)i&u< 
George K. Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Plaintiff's Addresses: 
Security Investment LTD 
84 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
William K. Olson 
2301 South Main 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
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ALLYSON BROWN, Clerk of the Second 
Judicial District Court, Farmington Utah; The 
STATE OF UTAH by and through its state 
treasurer, WILLIAM T. ALTER; its 
Administrative Office of the Courts, DANIEL 
J. BECKER, Administrator, and THE STATE 
OF UTAH, by any officer or agency receiving 
interest on funds deposited in courts, 
Defendants. 1 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 000700491 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The Court having considered Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the memorandum 
submitted in support thereof; and Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition thereto; and having 
heard the arguments of counsel; and being fully advised in the premises, hereby rules as follows: 
RULING 
A motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is a question of law for the Court, 
wherein the Court is required to determine if the complaint is legally sufficient on its face. In 
making that determination, the Court must assume that the factual allegations in the Complaint 
are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. 
With that in mind, the allegations in the Complaint allege that the Utah Department of 
Transportation (UDOT) filed a condemnation action against Plaintiff, Security Investment LTD 
and eight others in August of 1997. Pursuant to state law, UDOT also filed a motion for 
immediate occupancy, and deposited $290,600.00 with the Clerk of the Court, representing their 
estimate of the value of the property condemned. On April 22, 1999, the court on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, determined that all funds deposited belonged to Defendant, 
Security Investment LTD, and ordered that the principal sum be dispersed to them without 
prejudice to any action which they wished to make with respect to their claim for interest which 
accrued on the money while being deposited with the Clerk. The Clerk denied the payment of 
any interest based upon Section 78-24-4 U.C.A. and Rule 3-407(3)(F) U.R.J.A. 
The complaint also alleges that in April of 1997, UDOT filed a condemnation action 
against Plaintiff, William K. Olsen. Pursuant to state law, on May 20, 1997, UDOT filed a 
motion for immediate occupancy and deposited $139,300.00 with the Clerk of the Court, 
representing their estimate of the value of the property condemned. 
On June 30, 1999, the Court granted Olsen's motion to release the principal sum to them 
but declined to pay any interest on the sum based upon the same rational as in the Security 
Investment matter. 
Both Security Investment LTD and Olsen filed a motion with the Court requesting that 
interest be paid to them. The Court denied the motion and Plaintiffs appealed the matter to the 
Utah Supreme Court in separate appeals, no. 990369 & no. 990652. 
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The Supreme Court in an opinion handed down on December 14, 2000, affirmed the 
rulings of the district courts but declined to rule as to whether the Clerk of Court or others would 
be obligated to pay the interest as they were not proper parties before the Court. 
Section 78-27-4 U.C.A. provides: 
(1) (a) Any person depositing money in court, to be held in trust, shall pay it to the court 
clerk. 
(b) The clerk shall deposit the money in a court trust fund or with the county 
treasurer or city recorder to be held subject to the order of the court. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules governing the maintenance of court trust funds 
and the disposition of interest earnings on those trust funds. 
(3) (a) Any interest earned on trust funds that is not required to accrue to the litigants by 
Judicial Council rule or court order shall be deposited in a restricted account. 
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate funds from that restricted account to the Judicial 
Council to: 
(i) offset costs to the courts for collection and maintenance of court trust funds; 
and 
(ii) provide accounting and auditing of all court revenue and trust accounts. 
Under the statute, any interest that is not required to accrue to the litigants by Judicial 
Council rule or court order is to be deposited in a restricted account. The Legislature shall 
appropriate those funds to the Judicial Council to offset costs for collection and maintenance of 
court trust funds and to provide accounting and auditing of all court revenue and trust accounts. 
Pursuant to Section 78-24-4 U.C.A., the Judicial Council has adopted Rule 3-407(3)(F) 
which provides: 
(F) Interest bearing. 
(i) All trust accounts shall be interest bearing. The administrative office shall develop. 
procedures which provide for interest to accrue either to the state or to the litigants in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-4(3)(a). 
(ii) For trust amounts in excess of $5,000, the court may order or the litigant may 
request that such funds be deposited in an interest bearing escrow account. The account 
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shall be at an institution designated by the administrative office unless otherwise ordered 
by the court. 
(iii) For interest bearing accounts established at the request of the litigant or by court 
order, an administrative fee, in an amount established by the Council, shall be assessed. 
The account shall be maintained in the name of the court, and the State tax identification 
number shall be used. The court shall, in all orders providing for the withdrawal of trust 
funds, designate the person or entity to whom the earned interest is awarded. 
Subparagraph (i) provides that all accounts shall be interest bearing and requires the 
administrative office to develop procedures which provide for interest to accrue to the state or to 
the litigants. 
Subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) establish that when interest bearing escrow accounts are set 
up by court order or at the litigants' request, an administrative fee shall be assessed and further 
requires that in any order providing for the withdrawal of trust funds, the court shall designate 
the person or entity to whom the earned interest is to be awarded. 
In the case now presented before the Court, neither of the litigants requested nor did the 
courts order that the funds deposited be placed in an interest bearing escrow account, and no 
administrative fee was charged to either UDOT or the Plaintiffs here. The sums were therefore 
deposited in the restricted accounts as provided under section 78-27-4(3)(a) U.C.A. 
The Plaintiffs claim that the interest which accumulated on the proceeds while deposited 
with the court is their property and that the court's failure to pay over that interest constitutes an 
unconstitutional taking of their property without due process, in violation of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments to the United States Constitution; as a result of that taking their civil rights have 
been violated under Title 42, Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. Further, the retention of the 
interest constitutes a violation of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
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The Defendants deny all of these claims and filed a Motion to Dismiss, on February 2, 
2001. Having heard oral argument and again reviewed the parties' filings, the Court considers 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the following issues: 1) Whether Plaintiffs state a valid 
§ 1983 claim; 2) Whether the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by quasi judicial immunity 
and/or qualified immunity; 3) Whether Plaintiffs' claim under the Utah Constitution is properly 
before the Court; and 4) Whether Collateral Estoppel bars Plaintiffs from relitigating the issue 
raised in this lawsuit. The Court looks to applicable law in determination of the issues in turn. 
The Court first examines whether Plaintiffs state a valid § 1983 claim. In doing so, the 
Court examines whether Defendants are "persons" under § 1983 and whether the Complaint 
establishes a specific conduct violating the Plaintiffs' rights, the time and place of the conduct 
and the identity of the responsible parties. 
Section 1983 provides a remedy against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws...." 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
Defendants argue that they are not 'persons' under § 1983. In general, neither a state nor 
its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983, and a government entity 
that is an arm of the state is not a person within the meaning of § 1983. In Will v. Michigan, 491 
U.S. 58 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their 
official capacities are 'persons' under § 1983." IdL at 71; Ambus v. Utah State Board of Educ. 
858 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1993). A governmental entity that is an arm of the state is not a 
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person within the meaning of § 1983. Harrison v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 905-6 (10th Cir. 
1995). State agencies are considered "an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes." 
Hensel v. Office of Chief Admin. Hearing, 38 F.3d 505, 508 (10th Cir. 1994). 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the Utah Supreme Court in Ambus, held that 
government officials, in fact, can be sued under §1983 for prospective relief, and that the 
Defendants holding interest money are continuing to deprive the Plaintiffs of their property. 
Ambus, at 1376. Therefore, prospective relief is indicated. 
The Court finds that "[governmental officials sued in their official capacities are not 
'persons' for purposes of an action for damages under § 1983." Id Where government officials 
can be sued for "prospective relief, the Utah Supreme Court's ruling only entails injunctive, 
equitable, non-damage types of relief. Id. The Court further finds that interest money a 
defendant has not yet tendered does not amount to injunctive, equitable, non-damage types of 
relief, and as such, does not amount to "prospective relief1 as set forth in Ambus. Therefore, the 
Court finds that the Defendants are not 'persons' under § 1983. 
The Court next examines whether Plaintiffs' Complaint establishes an affirmative link 
between the alleged deprivation and the Defendants' conduct. A valid claim under § 1983 
requires plaintiffs to establish that they have been deprived of a right "secured by the 
Constitution and the laws," and then, that the deprivation was under color of state law. Baker v. 
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,140 (1979). 
Where Plaintiffs argue that interest is a part of just compensation and that the deprivation 
of such payments is an unconstitutional taking, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails 
to establish that the Defendants caused a deprivation of their established rights, "took" Plaintiffs' 
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property, or that any of the Defendants had a role in developing rules or polices governing the 
payment of interest issues. Instead, Plaintiffs Complaint only alleges that the Administrative 
Office of the Courts refused to authorize payment of interest based upon Plaintiffs' failure to 
comply with Utah Code provisions and Rules of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, Plaintiffs 
cannot show, as a matter of law, an unconstitutional taking, because a competent court of law has 
already determined that they never perfected their property right in the interest, and therefore, 
had no property right in the interest earned on the UDOT funds. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to establish that Defendants caused a 
deprivation of the Plaintiffs' rights or that a "taking" of Plaintiff s property occurred. Further 
Plaintiffs have failed to provide the Court with any case law supporting their position that § 78-
27-4 U.C.A. and Rule 3-407(3)(F) U.R.J.A., concerning the payment of interest are 
unconstitutional. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that a "taking" has occurred. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to establish an affirmative link 
between the alleged deprivation and the Defendants' conduct. 
Second, the Court examines whether the Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by quasi 
judicial immunity and/or qualified immunity. In Ambus, the Utah Supreme Court described 
immunity available to government officials. Absolute immunity, the Court held, applies to 
provide complete protection from damages liability and "defeats a suit at the outset." IdL at 1377. 
Absolute immunity has been extended to judges, prosecutors, legislators, and "officials who 
perform functions analogous to those of prosecutors and judges." Id at 1380. This absolute 
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"quasi-judicial" immunity also applies to court clerks and "administrative officials who perform 
duties that are functionally equivalent to those of court clerks." Id. 
Further, "[t]he law provides special protection for officials sued in their individual 
capacity for damages under § 1983 for acts committed within the scope of their office. Id,, at 
1377. Qualified immunity generally "shields government officials from undue interference with 
their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." IdL, quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982). Qualified immunity shields officials insofar as their conduct does not 
"violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known." Harlow, at 818. The law is clearly established "when it is well developed enough 
to inform the reasonable official that his conduct violates that law." Id. Qualified immunity 
"gives ample room for mistaken judgments" by protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or 
those who knowingly violate the law." Mallev v. Briegs, 475 U.S. 335. 343 (1986), This 
accommodation for reasonable error exists because "officials should not err always on the side of 
caution because they fear being sued." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984). 
Defendants argue that quasi judicial immunity applies to bar Plaintiffs' suit against 
Second District Court Clerk, Allyson Brown, and Utah State Court Administrator, Daniel 
Becker. In performing their duties as set forth in the Utah Code and the Rules of Judicial 
Administration, these Defendants have been named for performing tasks that are "integral to the 
judicial process." Ambus, at 1380. Therefore, they should be free from the tlireat of liability for 
performing their official duties. Defendants also argue that qualified immunity also applies to 
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bar Plaintiffs' suit against Allyson Brown, Daniel Becker, and State Treasurer, William Alter, in 
their individual capacities. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to show that each Defendant 
caused the violation of Plaintiffs' rights which were clearly established at the time of the conduct 
at issue. Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 1996). 
On the other hand, Plaintiffs argue that the Governmental Immunity Act specifically 
provides that interest is a part of just compensation, and therefore, there can be no immunity of 
any of the Defendants from suit for interest withheld and the continuing acts under color of 
statute and rules depriving Plaintiffs of just compensation. 
The Governmental Immunity Act § 63-30-10.5 provides: 
(1) As provided by Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of 
all governmental entities is waived for the recovery of compensation from the 
governmental entity when the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property 
for public uses without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed according to the requirements of Title 
78, Chapter 34, Eminent Domain. 
Plaintiffs also argue that Article I Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is self executing, 
and cite Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 635 (1990), Hamblin v. City of 
Clearfield. 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1990), and Hansen v. Salt Lake County. 794 P.2d 838, 847 
(Utah 1990), in support of their position. 
However, the Court finds that the cases cited by the Plaintiff are not applicable in this 
instance. These cases are distinguished in that each cause of action arose prior to the enactment 
of § 63-30-10.5 under the Governmental Immunity Act, waiving immunity when the 
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governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without 
compensation. A further distinction between the cases cited by the Plaintiffs and the matter now 
before the Court is the existence of a property right. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs has failed to establish a property right by perfecting their 
interest in the interest money, and therefore, may not now claim that they were deprived of that 
right. As previously stated, a "taking" did not occur. Therefore, the Court finds that the 
Defendants acted within the scope of their office to deny the payment of interest to which 
Plaintiffs did not have a right, and are immune from suit. 
Third, the Court examines whether Plaintiffs claim under the Utah Constitution is 
properly before the Court. Section 63-30-11(2) of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the 
"Act") reads: 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written 
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
In addition, the Act requires plaintiffs to file an undertaking at the time of filing the 
complaint. U.C.A. 63-30-19. These provisions apply even where the state has waived its 
immunity. The Utah Supreme Court has held that filing of the notice of claim is a "jurisdictional 
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees." Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 
977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). The Act's notice of claim requirement is not subject to 
exception, even if the governmental entity at issue has effective notice of the claim. Hall v. Utah 
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State Department of Corrections,^. 990529, Filed April 17, 2001; Lamarr. V. Utah Dep't of 
Transp., 828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992); Lister v. Utah Valley Community College. 881 P.2d 
933 (Utah App. 1994). Failure to file the required undertaking also requires dismissal of the 
complaint. Rippstein v. City of Provo, 929 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to properly file the notice of claim or the 
undertaking required under the Act. To the extent that they attempt to state a claim under Utah 
law, they have not properly invoked the Court's jurisdiction, and therefore, the state law claims 
should be dismissed. 
Plaintiffs agree that their claims under § 1983 may be subject to the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, and have informed the Court that they served an additional notice upon the 
Defendants on February 7, 2001, and would deposit $300.00 as specified in the Act. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to properly file the notice of claims or the 
undertaking required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and therefore, have not properly 
invoked this Court's jurisdiction. Although Plaintiffs have since acted to correct the mistake, the 
requirements of the Act must be strictly complied with, and cannot be retroactively cured. 
Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are not properly before the Court. 
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' procedural error, the Court finds, as previously discussed, that 
Plaintiffs do not have a property right to the interest at issue. 
Finally, the Court comes to Defendants' claim of collateral estoppel. Having found that 
the Defendants are not 'persons' under § 1983 and are immune from suit; and having found that-
Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Constitution are barred due to a failure to comply with the 
11 
procedural rules of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the Court chooses not to address the 
issue of collateral estoppel. 
In conclusion, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs fail to state a valid § 1983 claim. The 
Court finds that Defendants are not 'persons' under § 1983, Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to 
establish that Defendants caused a deprivation of the Plaintiffs' rights or that a "taking" of 
Plaintiffs property occurred, and Plaintiff has failed to establish an affirmative link between the 
alleged deprivation and the Defendants' conduct. The Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims against 
Defendants Brown and Becker are barred by quasi judicial as well as qualified immunity. The 
Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Alter are barred by qualified immunity. 
Furthermore, the Court finds Plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Constitution are not properly 
before the Court. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defense 
counsel is hereby directed by the Court to prepare Findings and Judgment in accordance with the 
Court's Ruling, and to submit copies to Plaintiffs' counsel at least five days before submitting it 
to the Court. 
Dated June Z\ ,2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
o WV& 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SECURITY INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, and WILLIAM K. 
OLSON, individually and BELL OLSON 
INVESTMENT LTD., a Utah limited 




ALLYSON BROWN, Clerk of the Second 
Judicial District Court, Farmington, Utah; 
The STATE OF UTAH by and through its 
state treasurer, WILLIAM T. ALTER; its 
Administrative Office of the Courts, 
DANIEL J. BECKER, Administrator, and 
THE STATE OF UTAH, by any officer or 
agency receiving interest on funds deposited 
in courts, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000700491 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
FILED | 
AUG - 6 2001 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
The defendants' Motion to Dismiss this action came before the Court at oral argument 
held April 17, 2001. After having considered the argument of counsel and the briefing on the 
motion, the Court entered its Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on June 21, 2001. The 
Court ruled that, as a matter of law, plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief they seek, and 
accordingly granted defendants' motion. The Court's findings are as follows: 
1. The State of Utah and the Administrative Office of the Courts, and defendants 
Brown, Alter and Becker in their official capacities, are not "persons" under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. 
2. Plaintiffs have failed to establish the requisite affirmative causal link between the 
actions of defendants and plaintiffs' alleged injuries. 
3. Plaintiffs did not perfect a property right in the UDOT interest funds at issue. 
Having no property right, there was no unconstitutional taking of plaintiffs' 
property, and therefore no violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 
4. Defendants Brown and Becker are entitled to quasi-judicial and qualified 
immunity. 
5. Defendant Alter is entitled to qualified immunity. 
6. The Court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Based on the foregoing findings, the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and 
DECREES that: 
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
2. All of plaintiffs' claims against defendants asserted in this lawsuit are dismissed 
on their merits, with prejudice. 
2 
3. Judgment is entered in favor of the defendants. 
Entered this 2>™ day of Qjn.rtitft'JC • 20° 1 • 
BY THE COURT: 
Rodney S. Pag£ 
District Court Judge 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this Qsb day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT to be mailed, United States mail, postage prepaid 
to: 
George K. Fadel 
Fadel Associates 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
^^^K^sm 
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78-27-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
instrument or the amount or kind of property, he must specify the amounts, 
terms or kind which he requires, or be precluded from objection afterwards. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-27-3. 





— By check. 
— By mail. 
Conditions. 
A tender, to be good, must be free from any 
condition which the tenderer does not have a 
right to insist upon. Sieverta v. White, 2 Utah 
2d 351, 273 R2d 974 (1954). 
Interest. 
If tender is made of full face of account, and 
no demand for interest is made, interest, at 
least for the purposes of a tender, is waived. 
Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 
434, 160 P. 283 (1916). 
Tender. 
— By check. 
Where a tender is made by check, the person 
to whom it is tendered must specify his objec-
tions or he will be deemed to have waived all 
objections, except such as he insists upon when 
tender is made. Hirsh v. Ogden Furn. & Carpet 
Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283 (1916). See also 
Ulibarri v. Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367,275 R2d 
170(1954). 
A check for the amount due, presented within 
time and when no exception is taken to the 
form of the tender, is a valid and legal tender of 
the amount due, but only when there are ad-
equate funds in the account of the drawer to 
pay such check upon presentation in due 
course. Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 
R2d 974 (1954). 
- B y mail. 
Tender of check by mail is good tender in 
absence of special objections. Hirsh v. Ogden 
Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283 
(1916). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. - 74 Am. Jur. 2d lender § 10. 
C.J.S. - 86 C.J.S. Tender §§ 12, 17, 26, 34, 
38, 43. 
Key Numbers. — Tender «=» 15(3). 
78-27-4. Money deposited in court, 
(1) (a) Any person depositing money in court, to be held in trust, shall pay 
it to the court clerk. 
(b) The clerk shall deposit the money in a court trust fund or with the 
county treasurer or city recorder to be held subject to the order of the 
court. 
(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules governing the maintenance of 
court trust funds and the disposition of interest earnings on those trust funds. 
(3) (a) Any interest earned on trust funds that is not required to accrue to 
the litigants by Judicial Council rule or court order shall be deposited in a 
restricted account. 
(b) The Legislature shall appropriate funds from that restricted ac-
count to the Judicial Council to: 
(i) offset costs to the courts for collection and maintenance of court 
trust funds; and 
(ii) provide accounting and auditing of all court revenue and trust 
accounts. 
436 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS Art V, § 1 
History: Const 1896. Cross-References. — Oaths of officers, 
Compiler's Notes. — The quotation marks § 52 1 1 
at the end of this section have been carried in 
brackets in all compilations since Revised Stat-
utes of 1898 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of oath form duly notarized by a deputy county 
clerk (a person duly authorized to administer 
Bond required in addition to oath
 o a t h 8 ) although he did not go through some 
Formal ritual unnecessary formal ritual, with the raising of his right 
Supreme Court justices required to take oath
 h a n d S u t e v M a t h e W 8 t 1 3 U t a h 2d 391, 375 
Bond required in addition to oath. P2<1 392 (1962) 
Statute requiring state treasurer to give
 S u e C o u r t j u s t i c e g i r e d to t a k e 
bond is not unconstitutional on ground that oath 
Legislature could not add to requirement in *..J " r n. a ^ ^ . .
 A 
this section State ex rel Stain v Chnstensen, ,. J u d g e " o f , t h e S u P r e m e C o u r t " u b 8 C " b f to 
84 Utah 185, 35 P2d 775 (1934) 'h,8f J*?* w h ° n e n t e ™f ,Tu ^ ^ J Z 
Cntchlow v Monson, 102 Utah 378, 131 P 2d 
Formal ritual unnecessary. 794 For sequel to this case, see State ex rel 
A deputy county recorder took the oath of Jugler v Grover, 102 Utah 459, 132 P 2d 125 
office, required by this section, by his signing (1942) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 67 C J S Officers and Public Em-
ployees § 46 
Key Numbers. — Officers ** 36(1) 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 
1 [Three departments of government 1 
Section 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of 
these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the 
others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
History: Const 1896. Legislative department, Utah Const, Art 
Crosa-References. — Executive depart- VI. 
ment, Utah Const., Art. VII. Municipal powers not delegable, Utah 
Judicial department, Utah Const, Art VIII. Const., Art. VI, § 28. 
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MISCELLANEOUS Art. XXII, § 1 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 63A Am. Jur. 2d Public Of- C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Officers and Public Em-
ficera and Employees § 431 et seq. ployees §§ 219, 224. 
Key Numbers. — Officers *=» 94, 99. 
Sec- 2. [Legislature to provide fees — Accounting.] 
The Legislature shall provide by law for the fees to be collected by all 
officers within the state. All state, district, county, city, town, and school 
officers shall be required by law to keep a true and correct account of all fees 
collected by them, and to pay the same into the proper treasury, and the 
officer whose duty it is to collect such fees shall be held responsible under his 
bond for the same. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.), 
S.J.IL 1. 
Cross-References. — Fees, Title 21. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS by law. State ex rel. Richards v. Stanton, 14 
Utah 180, 46 P. 1109 (1896). 
County clerks. 
Justices of the peace. Justices of the peace. 
This section should be construed in connec-
County clerks. tion with Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26, in de-
This section, and section immediately pre- termining right of legislature to regulate corn-
ceding, limit compensation to be paid county pensation of justices of the peace. Martineau v. 




1. [Homestead exemption.) 3. [Seat of government.! 
2. (Property rights of married women.] 
Section 1. [Homestead exemption.] 
The Legislature shall provide by statute for an exemption of a homestead, 
which may consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurte-
nances and improvements thereon, from sale on execution. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1988, S.J.R. 4. 
Cross-References. — Homestead, what 
constitutes, H 75-2-401, 78-23-3. 
267 
REVENUE AND TAXATION Art. XIII, § 5 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am Jur 2d State and C.J.S. — 84 C J S Taxation §§ 68, 73, 170 
Local Taxation § 218 Key Numbers. — Taxation *=» 63, 158 
Sec. 5. [Local authorities to levy local taxes — Sharing tax 
and revenues by political subdivisions.] 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, 
town or other municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate 
authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes of such corporation. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary con-
tained in this Constitution, political subdivisions may share their tax and 
other revenues with other political subdivisions as provided by statute. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1982, S.J.R. 3. 
Cross-References. — Appropriations and 
tax limitation, § 59-17a-101 et seq. 
City taxing power, Utah Const, Art XI, sec 
5. 
ANALYSIS 
Agricultural extension work. 
Allocation of future tax. 




Excess revenue refunds. 
License fees. 
Purpose of taxation. 
Utah Neighborhood Development Act 
Water district. 
Agricultural extension work. 
Statute (Comp. Laws 1917, 5 5292) authoriz-
ing contracts between trustees of state agricul-
tural college and county commissioners with 
respect to agricultural extension work, and au-
thorizing commissioners to provide funds nec-
essary for the work in their respective coun-
ties, was not invalid as imposing a tax for 
county purposes by the legislature. Bailey v. 
Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925). 
Allocation of future tax. 
The law is well settled that in exercising the 
powers of the state, the legislature may require 
the revenue of a municipality to be applied to 
uses other than that for which the taxes were 
levied; thus there was no constitutional trans-
gression in the allocation of certain expected 
tax increments (generated by new construction 
in an area of urban blight) for repayment of 
Redevelopment Agency bonds. Tribe v. Salt 
Lake City Corp, 540 P2d 499 (Utah 1975). 
County taxing power, § 17-4-3 
Revenue sharing between political subdivi 
sions, § 11-13-16 5 
"Corporate authorities" construed. 
"Corporate authorities," as used in this sec-
tion, are those municipal officers who either 
are directly elected by municipality's inhabit-
ants or are appointed in some mode to which 
such inhabitants have given their assent. State 
ex rel. Wright v Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P 
1061 (1901). 
Court fees. 
The provisions of this section were contra-
vened by statute which attempted to fix sched-
ule of county clerks' fees for services in probate 
matters based on sliding scale where fees in-
creased as values of estates increased, since 
such attempt was an imposition of taxes with-
out uniformity for counties' use and benefit 
Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P 2d 
259, 108 A.L.R. 513 (1936). 
Dependent mothers. 
The phrase "for all purposes of such corpora-
tion," is synonymous with the phrase, "public 
purposes," and Chapter 13 of Title 17 (Public 
Aid for Dependent Mothers) would be upheld 
as "public purpose." Denver & R.G.R.R. v. 
Grand County, 61 Utah 294, 170 P. 74, 3 
A.L.R. 1224 (1917). 
Discriminatory tax. 
A city licensing ordinance which was a reve-
nue-raising measure and put some of the busi-
nesses affected on a flat fee basis with only 
about one-twelfth as much tax as other busi-
nesses which paid on a sales tax basis was un-
constitutionally discriminatory Orem City v. 
Pyne, 16 Utah 2d 355, 401 P 2d 181 (1965) 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT 5 
Criminal actions—Provisions concerning—Due process of law and 
just compensation clauses. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Constitutional right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation, 
generally, USCS Constitution, Amendment 6. 
Prohibition against state's denial of due process or equal protection, USCS 
Constitution, Amendment 14. 
Grand jury procedure, generally, USCS Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 
6. 
Procedure as to indictment and information, generally, USCS Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Rule 7. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Federal Procedure L Ed: 
Access to District Courts, Fed Proc, L Ed § 1:466. 
Administrative Procedure, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 2:27, 2:60, 2:121, 2:143. 
Appeal, Certiorari, and Review, Fed Proc, L Ed §§ 5:109, 5:403. 
Arbitration, Fed Proc, L Ed § 8:2. 
Armed Forces, Civil Disturbances, and National Defense, Fed Proc, L 
Ed §§ 9:369; 10:64. 
1 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § £ 2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
Appointment of administrator of estate. 
Withholding tax. 
In general. 
No man can have a vested interest in the 
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to 
insist that another work for him, since that 
would violate this section. McGrew v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am. Jur. 2d Involuntary 
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq. 
—TRatory: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen 
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq. 
ANALYSIS 







Defense to condemnation proceeding. 
Elements of taking or damage. 




Interest in condemnation proceedings. 
Inverse condemnation. 
Just compensation. 
Municipal employment prerequisites. 
Removal of personal property. 
Services of attorney in defending indigent. 




Advance payment of compensation. 
This section provides merely that the prop-
Appointment of administrator of estate. 
This section prohibits the appointment of a 
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's 
estate if that person refuses to consent to such 
appointment. In re Estate of duff, 587 P.2d 
128 (Utah 1978). 
Withholding tax. 
Provision requiring that a city withhold 
state income taxes due from employees does 
not subject the city to involuntary servitude. 
Salt Lake City v. State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah 
2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961). 
C.J.S, — 70 C.J.S. Peonage § 3; 80 C.J.S. 
Slaves § 10. 
Key Numbers. — Slaves <=> 24. 
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation, and does not 
require compensation to be paid in advance. 
Anderson Inv. Corp. v. State, 28 Utah 2d 379, 
503 P.2d 144 (1972). 
Airplane overflights. 
For discussion of taking issues in an action 
by landowners alleging that their land has 
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 
1986). 
Closing street. 
Where city, without notice, petition, or hear-
ing, closes a portion of a street and alley abut-
ting on school board-owned property on both 
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus 
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned prop-
erty, there has been a taking requiring just 
compensation. Boskovich v. Mid vale City 
Corp., 121 UUh 445, 243 P.2d 435 (19527. 
Closing of city street and alleged impair-
ment of access to commercial properties was 
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the mean-
ing of this section; the alleged damages re-
sulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence 
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Sec, 22, [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Art I, § 6 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Mootnees Ques-
tion in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Pe-
titioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudica-
tion, 1969 Utah L Rev 266 
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscien-
tious Objector, 1969 Utah L Rev 328 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act Limitation 
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L Rev 695 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am Jur 2d Habeas Cor-
pus §5 6 to 7 
C.J.S. — 16A C J S Constitutional Law 
§ 472 et seq , 39 C J S Habeas Corpus § 5 
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal 
courts against state criminal prosecutions 
growing out of civil rights activities, 8 
A L R 3 d 301 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 
83(1), 121 to 123 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legisla-
ture from defining the lawful use of arms. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd 8.S.), 
SJf.lt 3. 
Compiler's Note*. — Laws 1983, Senate 
Joint Resolution No 2, proposing to amend 
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Res-
olution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd SS), § 2 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALY8I8 
Prospective application 
Regulation of right to bear arms 
Prospective application. 
The amendment to this provision by Laws 
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3 
is to be given prospective application only. 
State v. Wacek, 703 P 2d 296 (Utah 1985). 
Regulation of right to bear arms. 
This section gives sufficient authority for the 
legislature to forbid the possession of danger-
ous weapons by those who are not citizens, or 
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incom-
petent. State v Beorchia, 630 P 2d 813 (Utah 
1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right 
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?, 
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751 
Am. Ju r . 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons 
and Firearms 5 4. 
C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S Constitutional Law 
} 611; 94 OJ.S. Weapons 8 2. 
A.L.H. — Gun control laws, validity and 
construction of, 28 A.L.R 3d 845 
Validity of statute proscribing possession or 
carrying of knife, 47 AL.R4th 651. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 82; 
Weapons *= 1, 3, 6 et seq 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
ofjaw, 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen-
erally, § 78-34-1 et seq 
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78-34-9 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 29A C J S Eminent Domain § 267 Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain «=» 
etseq 198(1) 
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action — De-
posit paid into court — Procedure for payment 
of compensation. 
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the 
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the 
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice 
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff 
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including 
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge 
thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises 
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the 
condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall 
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court 
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to 
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75% 
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to be 
condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, 
and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of just 
compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties 
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded as 
provided in Section 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and the 
said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest 
at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the 
property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession thereof by the 
plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; but 
interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into 
court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court shall order that 
the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just 
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a defendant as 
aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses 
excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the compensation finally 
awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the 
amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment against the 
plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency. If the amount of money so received by 
the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the court shall enter 
judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess. Upon the filing 
of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the time within 
which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall be required 
to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such orders in 
respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and other 
charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, 9 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Officers before whom 
Supp., 104-34-9; L. 1967, ch. 220, { 1. affidavits may be taken, § 78-26-5 
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